Perceptual judgements are, by nature, a product of both sensation and the
A central challenge in perception research is to understand how the world looks, feels, and sounds, as opposed to how it is remembered, imagined, or judged. But perceptual judgements are, by nature, a product of both sensation and the cognitive operations responsible for producing measurable behaviour. Changes in perceptual decision making could thus equally arise from changes to sensory encoding and perception, or from later decisional processes that operate independently of perception. This ambiguity has fostered persistent debate regarding the degree to which our cognitions ¾ like imaginations, motivations, or beliefs ¾ can change the sensory processes that determine what we Much of what we know about human perception has resulted from investigating sensory aftereffects 6, 7 . An aftereffect is a change in the measured boundary between perceptual categories, which can result from prolonged and repeated exposures to a specific stimulus 8 , or rapidly from a single brief exposure to a test stimulus 9, 10, 11 . It remains a matter of debate, however, how best to dissociate perceptual from post-perceptual effects on decision making 12, 13 . We examine this problem by using motion-direction judgements and subjective confidence, and we show that reports of high and low confidence provide important information about the cause of changes in perceptual decisions.
Perceptual decisions are often measured by forced-choice categorisations.
Participants might be tasked with determining which binary category a test stimulus belongs, for example motion direction (left or right), orientation (clockwise or counter-clockwise tilt), or facial characteristics (masculine or feminine). Stimuli that appear ambiguous (e.g. incoherent motion, near vertical orientations, or androgynous faces) represent the boundary between these categories and, in an unbiased observer, are equally likely to be categorised as belonging to either category.
Metacognition research shows that an individual can accurately predict their own ability to discriminate between perceptual categories 14, 15 . Decisions likely to be correct carry greater feelings of confidence, whereas decisions likely to be incorrect (or made by guessing) carry lower confidence. The individual's boundary between categories is their point of subjective equality (PSE), characterised by both probabilistic responses and subjective uncertainty.
Since typical observers can accurately rate their own performance in perceptual decision tasks, confidence might provide important information about whether an aftereffect represents a change in a perceptual or cognitive boundary. On one hand, aftereffects caused by changes to sensory encoding should equally impact categorical decisions and confidence reports, because the sensory evidence underlying both judgements has changed. On the other hand, aftereffects arising only from changes to decision processes 12, 13 might selectively or disproportionately impact decisions made under uncertainty, without corresponding changes in confidence (see Figure 1 ). 
Experiment 1
We first checked that aftereffects can be equally estimated from categorical decisions and confidence judgements.
People made categorical direction decisions (left / right) and confidence judgments (low / high) about tests that varied in direction and motion coherence.
Cumulative Gaussian functions were fit to each participant's distribution of rightward direction judgements as a function of motion coherence (see Methods).
The 50% points were taken as estimates of the point of subjective equality (PSE) ¾ the stimulus value equally likely to be judged as moving left or right. A raised
Gaussian function was fit to each participant's distribution of low-confidence responses, and the peak of the fitted function was taken as a second PSE estimate ¾ the point of peak uncertainty. All t-tests reported are two-tailed repeated measures tests for equality of means. All Bayes' factors were estimated using JASP software 19 , with the default Cauchy prior width of 0.707.
Baseline
To illustrate our approach, in Figure 2 we depict distributions of categorical decisions (top) and expressions of uncertainty (or low-confidence; bottom). As can be seen, functions fit to these distributions can provide a closely matched PSE 
Coherent motion adaptation
In the adaptation phase, participants adapted to a dot motion stimulus with 30% coherence, moving either to the left or right (see methods for further details).
Adaptation These data are also depicted in Figure 3 (left panel, bottom). provided an equivalent estimate of an aftereffect known to result from physiological changes that impact perception 18, 20 .
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 showed that the motion aftereffect can be measured equally well using categorical perceptual decisions and confidence judgments. In Experiment 2 we assess the logical counterpoint: an aftereffect that results from people making different decisions about ambiguous inputs, without any perceptual changes. To achieve this, in Experiment 2 people 'adapt' to motion with no coherent direction. Participants were then instructed to make a default decision (either left or right, according to instruction) when they encounter subjectively ambiguous tests. This experiment tested the robustness of each response method against decision biases.
Adapt to random motion
Participants 'adapted' to a random dot motion stimulus (0% coherence). This should have no systematic impact on sensory encodings of motion 20 . A static direction cue, an arrow pointing to the left or right, was also presented above the 'adaptor' (see Methods for further details). We instructed participants to adopt a default decision, rather than guess, if they were unable to determine the direction of a test. This prompted people to report either the direction consistent (congruent condition) or inconsistent (incongruent condition) with the arrow when test motion direction was ambiguous. The congruent condition is expected to produce category decisions consistent with an assimilative aftereffect (when tests are judged as being similar to an 'adaptor') 21 . The incongruent condition is expected to produce categorical decisions changes consistent with a negative aftereffect (when tests are judged as being dissimilar to an 'adaptor', as in the classic motion-direction aftereffect measured in Experiment 1). The important question is the degree to which confidence judgments are impacted by systematically biased categorical decisions about ambiguous inputs. Figure 3) .
Categorical direction decisions

Confidence results
When faced with an ambiguous test, participants were no more likely to report low 
Dissociation of decision and confidence effects
There was a clear dissociation between PSE estimates from direction decisions and confidence judgments in the congruent (decision DPSE = 13.46, SD = 6.20;
confidence DCONF = 0.50, SD = 1.68; difference, t 14 = 9.23, p < .001) and incongruent (decision DPSE = 14.94, SD = 7.91; confidence DCONF = 0.41, SD = opposite contexts, we adopted it to assess the likely cause of serial dependence.
Experiment 3
Recent studies have established a contingency between perceptual decisions and preceding tests, without any need for protracted adaptation periods 9, 10 . One interpretation is that serial dependence results from rapid sensory adaptation, which measurably impacts perception on a trial by trial basis. Another interpretation suggests that serial dependence can result from post-perceptual aspects of decision making, like working memory 11 , or from people repeating their previous response when subsequent stimuli are ambiguous 17 . We assessed these proposals by measuring serial dependencies between sequential categorical decisions and confidence judgments.
People made categorical direction decisions (left / right) and confidence judgments (low / high) about tests that varied in direction and motion coherence, akin to baseline trials in Experiment 1 (see Methods for further details).
N-back effects
Trial responses were subdivided according to the direction of the last test (1-back data), and according to the direction of the test two trials prior (2-back data).
Functions were fit to these data to quantify 1-back and 2-back effects on categorical decision making, as a function of motion direction and coherence on the present test (see Methods for further details).
1-back effects
Participants tended to categorise tests as moving in the opposite direction relative 
2-back effects
Participants tended to categorise tests as moving in the same direction as the test two trials prior (t-2; L PSE = 1.34, SD = 2.98; R PSE = -1.20, SD = 2.45; difference, t 21 = 3.44, p = .002; see Figure 4 ). There was, however, no discernible impact of this Error bars depict 95% CIs.
General Discussion
Our data indicate that confidence provides important diagnostic information for distinguishing sensory encoding aftereffects from aftereffects that do not change perception. Experiment 1 showed that an aftereffect driven by sensory adaptation 18, 20 can be measured equally well using categorical decisions and confidence judgments (see Figures 2 & 3) . Experiment 2 showed that a nonperceptual decision bias (an instruction to make systematically biased decisions about ambiguous inputs) had different impacts on categorical decisions and confidence; whereas categorical decisions provided evidence consistent with n.s *** n.s * large aftereffects, confidence judgments suggested no change in perception (see Figure 3 ). This implies that confidence can be robust against decision biases that favour one category response over another when sensory input is ambiguous.
Having validated our approach in opposite contexts, Experiment 3 examined serial dependencies between successive moving tests. Our results suggest that sensory adaptation can indeed occur rapidly 9, 10 . We observed an equal impact of the last trial on subsequent categorical decisions and confidence judgments (see Figure 4 , left, and Figure 5 , 1-back results). These data mirror our results for an aftereffect known to be caused by sensory adaptation (Experiment 1), so these results suggest that the last test can act as an adapting stimulus, generating a contrastive aftereffect that rapidly changes perception.
Our Experiment 3 data also reveal serial dependence had an assimilative influence on decision making 10, 21 . The stimulus two trials prior to a test (2-back) had an attractive impact on categorical decisions. However, there was no evidence for a 2-back assimilative aftereffect for confidence judgments (see Figure 4 , right, and Our study shows that aftereffects estimated exclusively from categorical decisions only provide ambiguous evidence in favour of perceptual changes. Here we have
shown that this evidence should be augmented with confidence measures. Using the classic motion-direction aftereffect 18, 20 (see Experiment 1), we show that confidence is equally impacted by physiological processes that change perception. However, in Experiment 2, we showed that confidence measures could remain veridical when categorical decisions change ¾ these data are otherwise suggestive of an 'aftereffect', but arose because people were making systematically biased judgments about perceptually ambiguous tests. These data suggest that adding confidence judgments to categorical decision protocols (which are typically exclusively used to measure perceptual aftereffects) can reveal additional diagnostic information about the likely cause of a measured aftereffect.
It is important to note that confidence was a highly sensitive measure for the aftereffects that arose because of physiological processes that change perception (see Figure 6 , compare Experiments examining sensory aftereffects have been vital to developing our understanding of the physiological processes that underlie perception and perceptual decision making. Ultimately, however, we would like to be able to differentiate perceptual and post-perceptual processes, because people can make different decisions even when inputs might look, feel, or sound identical.
This dilemma can be addressed by identifying the range of inputs that elicit greatest uncertainty ¾ which can be achieved by asking participants to report on their confidence in each categorical perceptual decision.
Conclusion
Confidence reports can provide additional information for determining if an aftereffect changes how the world looks, or sounds, or feels. Our approach could augment traditional protocols, at little cost in time and effort. were recruited from a first-year student pool.
Ethics
Ethical approval for all experiments was obtained from the University of Queensland's (UQ) Ethics Committee, and all experimental tasks were performed in accordance with the UQ guidelines and regulations for research involving human participants. Each participant provided informed written consent to participate in the study and were made aware that they could withdraw at any moment from the study without prejudice or penalty. First year students received course credit in exchange for participation.
Stimuli and apparatus
In all tasks the motion stimuli were generated using Matlab software and the Psychophysics Toolbox 24, 25 . Stimuli were presented on Dell P791 monitors (1024x768 pixels) with a refresh rate of 60Hz. The dot-motion stimuli were singlepixel dots rendered blue (RGB = 0,0,255). Coherent motion signals were created by translating dots in the coherent direction by 1 pixel on each frame. To avoid participants tracking individual dots, a new subset of dots (equal to the % dot coherence) were selected at random on each frame. All other dots were moved to a new and randomly selected location on each frame, within the aperture, to create a background of incoherent motion. Figure 6 : Procedures for each experiment. Participants adapted to stimuli that depicted either coherent motion or random motion and a static direction cue. Each trial within a testing block consisted of an adaptation phase (except for baseline) followed by a dot test probe. The direction of the adapting stimulus (left or right) was consistent within the first half of a block, and then changed direction for the second half. Adapting stimuli appeared for 18s on the first trial of each block, and on the middle trial when the stimulus changed direction, and for 6s on all other trials. Dot test probes were present for 1s, appearing on the second frame after the adapting stimulus disappeared. A new trial began once participants had recorded their direction decision (left or right) and reported their confidence (whether they had confidence that their decision was correct ¾ yes / high confidence or no / low confidence). In Experiment 1, adapting stimuli consisted of 100 dot stimuli, each 1 pixel in size.
A coherent motion signal was achieved by selecting 30 dots at random on each frame to be displaced left or right by one pixel. All other dots were redrawn at random locations. Again, to avoid participants tracking individual dots, a new subset of dots (equal to the % dot coherence) were selected at random on each frame. All other dots were moved to a new and randomly selected location on each frame, within the aperture, to create a background of incoherent motion.
Adapting motion was in one direction for the first half of the block of trials, and in the other direction for the second half of the block, with the initial adaptation direction determined at random for each participant.
In Experiment 2 'adapting' stimuli were similar to Experiment 1, with two exceptions. First, motion coherence was 0, so all dots were redrawn at random locations on each frame. Second, a static direction cue was presented directly above the stimulus window ¾ an arrow pointing to the left or right (see Figure 6 ).
The static direction cue was in one consistent direction for the first half of a block of trials, and reversed for the second half of the testing block. The initial cue direction was determined at random for each participant.
In Experiments 1 and 2, each test stimulus was presented 10 times, and repeated for each adaptation or cue direction (totalling 220 stimulus observations). There were no adapting stimuli in Experiment 3, so each test stimulus was viewed 50 times (totalling 550 stimulus observations).
Procedure
Participants received a written instruction of the experimental procedure. After reading the instructions, participants were then verbally queried whether they understood how to report their responses. All understood the direction judgement was to probe which direction the test appeared to move (left or right), and how to respond if they were unsure (which was varied according to experiments). Likewise, all participants understood to report whether they had high or low confidence in each response or, if it was more intuitive, to report whether they thought their guess was likely correct or incorrect. All participants verbally acknowledged that they understood both the direction and the confidence responses.
When participants had acknowledged they understood the instructions, they then H. Arnold, who provided critical revisions. All authors wrote and approved the final version of the manuscript.
